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Abstract 
 
In this paper we present a preliminary estimate of the financial impact of the recent reform of 
the Spanish pension system. After updating the projections of pension expenditure 
constructed in de la Fuente and Doménech (2010) for the period 2008-60, we analyze the 
impact on this variable of raising the retirement age from 65 to 67 years, extending from 15 to 
25 years the period over which wages are averaged to calculate the starting pension and 
increasing from 35 to 37 the number of contribution years required to obtain a "full pension." 
Conditional on a series of assumptions about the evolution of employment, productivity and 
demographics, our estimates suggest that these measures will reduce pension expenditure by 
up to 1.4 percentage points of GDP once the reforms have been fully implemented in 2027, 
thereby stabilizing pension expenditure at a bit over 9% of GDP during the transition period 
and preventing the emergence of a structural deficit in the system before the end of the next 
decade. On the other hand, the existing uncertainty about the future evolution of the relevant 
variables suggests that it would be desirable to bring forward in time the introduction of the 
periodic evaluation of the system (the so-called sustainability factor) so as to have in place a 
mechanism that can be used to modulate the rhythm and scope of the reform if the system's 
financial situation requires it before the end of the transitional period. 
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 1. Introduction 
This paper presents a preliminary estimate of the impact of the reform of the Spanish public 
pension system approved by Parliament in late July 2011 (BOE, 2011). Our starting point is 
the estimate of expenditure in the absence of reforms presented in de la Fuente and 
Doménech (2010) for the 2008-2060 period, which in turn relies on Eurostat's recent 
population projections for Spain. After making some adjustments to these projections in light 
of recent experience, we analyze the impact on expected pension expenditure and on the 
system’s net financial balance of the three main measures included in the reform package: 
raising the retirement age from 65 to 67 years for workers with less than 38.5 years of social 
contributions, extending from 15 to 25 years the period over which wages are averaged to 
calculate the starting pension (the “pension calculation period”) and increasing from 35 to 37 
the number of years of social contributions that are required to be entitled to a “full pension” 
(i.e., to 100% of the so-called regulatory base of the pension).  
The rest of the paper is divided into six sections and an appendix. Section 2 describes the 
recent reform and places it in context. Section 3 outlines the methodology that will be used to 
project pension expenditure in coming decades. Section 4 presents the baseline scenario – in 
which the present system remains unchanged – and section 5 quantifies the effects of the 
reform. Section 6 concludes with a brief summary of the implications of the analysis and 
some recommendations derived from them. Finally, the appendix collects some technical 
details on data sources and on the Eurostat population projections we take as a reference. 
 
 2. The Spanish pension reform of 2011 
An active debate on pension reform has been raging in Spain for almost twenty years. 
Starting in the mid 1990s, academics, private analysts and international organizations have 
produced numerous warnings about the adverse effects of rapid aging on pension finances 
and have insisted on the need to curtail the system’s generosity in order to guarantee its long-
term sustainability.1 Until recently, however, the ongoing debate has translated into only 
minor adjustments of the public pension system as all political parties have been extremely 
reluctant to even discuss impopular measures that would have been strongly opposed by 
militant labor unions. Between the mid 1990s and the onset of the current crisis, moreover, 
                                                
1 There is an extensive literature on the sustainability of the Spanish pension system. Among many 
other studies, see MTSS (1995), Barea et al (1995, 1996 and 1997), Herce et al (1996), Boldrin et al (1999), 
Jimeno and Licandro (1999), Jimeno (2000), da Rocha and Lores (2005), Díaz Giménez and Díaz 
Saavedra (2006 and 2008), Conde and Alonso (2006), EPC (2006), Gil et al (2007), Jimeno, Rojas and 
Puente (2008), MTIN (2008), Doménech and Melguizo (2008) and Moral-Arce et al (2008).   
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strong migratory inflows and rapid employment growth helped improve the system’s 
finances by reducing dependency ratios and diminished the perceived urgency of the 
reforms.  
In recent years, however, the situation has radically changed. The current economic crisis has 
brought with it a dramatic deterioration of Spanish public finances and increasing pressure 
from our EU partners and from financial markets to bring the public deficit (which exceeded 
11% of GDP in 2009) under control. The situation has forced the Spanish Government to 
adopt drastic fiscal consolidation measures starting in May 2010 and to publicly commit itself 
to a series of structural reforms that are widely considered necessary to facilitate growth, 
reduce unemployment and restore budget balance.  
The recently approved reform of the pension system has been a key component of this 
reformist strategy from the start. Given the large and rising weight of pensions in public 
expenditure, their reform is surely one of the most effective levers in the Government’s hands 
to improve the long-term sustainability of our public finances – and, perhaps even more 
crucially, to influence market perceptions of long term solvency risks, which can have 
immediate effects on sovereign risk premia and on credit availability. Awareness of this fact 
has probably contributed a lot to the Government’s resolve to actively pursue a serious 
reform of the pension system. A crucial factor that helped insure its success has been the 
weak position in which labor unions found themselves after the widespread failure of the 
general strike they organized in September 2010 to protest against the Government’s fiscal 
consolidation plans. Fearing a new setback, the two main national trade unions preferred to 
avoid an all-out confrontation and accepted to enter into negotiations with the Government 
and the Employer Confederations to reach an agreement on the reform, focusing their efforts 
on softening some aspects of the original Government proposal, particularly in connection 
with the raising of the retirement age.  
The end result of the process was a tripartite agreement on what must be considered by 
Spanish standards a rather ambitious reform of the public pension system. The document 
signed in January 2011 by the Spanish Government and the social partners (ASE, 2011) and 
passed into law seven months later with minor changes (BOE, 2011) contains three key 
measures which will be implemented gradually between 2013 and 2027: raising the 
retirement age from 65 to 67 years, extending the pension calculation period from 15 to 25 
years and increasing from 35 to 37 the number of contribution years required to reach 100% 
of the regulatory base.2 In addition, the new law introduces a so-called sustainability factor, a 
quinquennial evaluation of the system that, starting in 2032, will trigger whatever parametric 
adjustments are necessary to ensure its sustainability, but does not specify how such 
adjustments will be calculated beyond requiring that this be done taking into account the 
observed increase in life expectancy at 67. Finally, the recent law includes additional 
measures that affect the minimum retirement age and the incentives to postpone retirement 
                                                
2 The law also modifies the scale that relates the number of contribution years with the percentage of 
the regulatory base to be collected as a pension. It does not change, however, the minimum requirement 
of 15 years of contributions (to be entitled to 50% of the regulatory base). 
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among other things and envisages exceptions to some of the new pension rules. Perhaps the 
most important of these exceptions has to do with the possibility of maintaining retirement at 
the age of 65 for long contribution careers (understood as those of at least 38.5 years) and for 
workers engaged in especially risky or arduous activities. We estimate that this provision 
may in practice exempt up to 50% of the relevant population from the planned increase in the 
retirement age.3   
 
Figure 1: Timetable for the implementation of the main reforms 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 summarises the timetable for the application of the reform. The retirement age will 
rise gradually, at a rate of one month per year between 2013 and 2018 and two months per 
year between 2019 and 2027. The calculation period will be increased from 15 to 25 years at a 
uniform pace between 2013 and 2022. Finally, the contribution period required to be entitled 
                                                
3 According to MITIN (2011b, p. 159) 64.5% of those entering retirement in 2011 had at least 35 years of 
contribution. Devesa (2009, p. 64) reports that, on average, the affiliates to the General Regime entering 
retirement in 2008 had paid social contributions during 38.1 years. Bank of Spain (2011, p. 66) also 
reaches a similar conclusion using data from the Continuous Sample of Working Lives. 
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to 100% of the regulatory base will be increased in six-month steps in 2013, 2020, 2023 and 
2027, with simultaneous adjustments in the scale relating the number of years of contribution 
to the amount of the pension, as set forth in a scale included in the law (BOE 2011, art. 4.6). 
These reforms are in line with those adopted in recent years by other European countries.4 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy and the United Kingdom 
have increased the official retirement age. Additionally, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Italy, Portugal and Sweden have introduced different sustainability corrections in pension 
calculations based on life expectancy or dependency ratios. The system resulting from the 
Spanish reform closely resembles the German model, although with a much higher 
replacement rate (ratio between the first pension and the last salary) and a lower number of 
years required for early retirement or to be entitled to a “full pension.” After the reform, the 
official retirement age is the same in both countries (67 years), whereas the number of 
contribution years for a full pension is 38.5 in Spain vs 45 in Germany. Similarly, the number 
of contribution years (33) required for early retirement (between 61 and 63 years of age) is 
slightly lower in Spain than in Germany (35 years of contribution for retirement at 63).  
 
 3. A methodology for projecting pension expenditure 
Our projections of spending on contributory pensions with and without the recent reform are 
constructed using two instruments. The first one is a decomposition of this variable, 
measured as a percentage of GDP, into a series of factors that reflect, respectively, how 
pension expenditure is influenced by demographic factors, the evolution of employment and 
the generosity of the system, as measured by the ratio between the average pension and 
average output per employed worker.5 Modelling the evolution of the first two factors is, in 
principle, a simple exercise. If we take as a given the population projections elaborated by 
Spain’s National Statistical Institute (INE) or by Eurostat, we only need to make an 
assumption regarding the evolution of employment in order to project the behavior of the 
ratio between employed and retired persons, which is about half the story we want to tell.  
The other half is related to the evolution of the "generosity" ratio of the public pension system 
and poses more difficult problems, partly because the time path of this indicator is not 
independent from that of employment (through the average years of contribution of the stock 
of pensioners) and partly because its value depends in a complex manner on a series of 
parameters that summarize the procedure used to calculate each individual’s pension on the 
basis of his contribution record (including, for instance, the number of years over which 
wages are averaged to calculate the pension’s regulatory base). The instrument we will use to 
tackle this second problem is a highly simplified model of aggregate pension expenditure 
developed in de la Fuente (2011). The model can be used to calculate the steady-state value 
                                                
4 For a review of the reforms undertaken in other European countries in recent years, see Alonso and 
Conde (2007), OECD (2009 and 2011) and Bank of Spain (2011). 
5 The term “generosity ratio” has been used in this context by different authors and institutions, 
including the IMF (2010) and Cotlear (2011). An alternative term also found in the literature for the ratio 
of interest would be the "benefit ratio." In the present paper, “generous” means “large” in relation to 
average output per worker, without any charity-like or free-lunch connotations. 
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towards which the generosity ratio of the system can be expected to converge in the long 
term in the absence of policy changes and under the assumption of constant rates of growth 
of productivity and employment. The short- and medium-term dynamics of the generosity 
ratio will be modelled as a process of gradual convergence towards the steady state described 
by the model.      
 
 3.1. The components of pension expenditure 
To analyze the dynamics of pension expenditure as a fraction of GDP, it is useful to start by 
writing this ratio as the product of three factors that reflect, respectively, the influence of 
demography, employment and the benefit level or generosity of the pension system.6  
Let PEXP be total expenditure on pensions. The ratio of this magnitude to GDP can be 
written as follows 
  (1) PEXPGDP =
NPENS
L
PEXP
NPENS
GDP
L
=
NPENS
L
AVPENS
Q = NPENSPW *GENQ  
where NPENS is the number of currently payable pensions and L total employment. Hence, 
the fraction of GDP that is spent on pensions is equal to the number of pensions per 
employed worker (NPENSPW) multiplied by an indicator (GENQ) of the "generosity" of the 
average pension as measured by the ratio between this variable (AVPENS) and average labor 
productivity (Q). It is useful to rewrite the first term of the decomposition as follows: 
  (2) NPENSPW = NPENSL =
NPENS
NRET
NRET
NWA
NWA
L = COV *DEP *EMP  
where NRET and NWA  denote, respectively, the population that has reached the age of 
retirement – currently 65 years – and the working-age population, which we will identify for 
now as that between the ages of 18 and 64. Hence, the number of pensioners per employed 
worker can be expressed as the product of three factors: the rate of pension coverage (COV = 
number of pensions per person of retirement age), the old-age dependency rate (DEP = 
number of potential pensioners per working-age person) and the inverse of the employment 
rate of the working-age population (EMP). Combining (1) and (2), we end up with: 
  (3) PEXPGDP = DEP *EMP *COV *GENQ  
 
 3.2. A simple model of pension expenditure 
De la Fuente (2011) develops a simple accounting model of aggregate pension expenditure in 
an economy with exogenous wages and employment. The model uses highly simplified 
assumptions, including non-stochastic lifespans and constant rates of growth of employment 
and productivity, ignores the heterogeneity of agents within each cohort and the endogeneity 
                                                
6 This type of decomposition has been used frequently in the literature. See, among others, Jimeno, 
Rojas and Puente (2008) and Doménech and Melguizo (2008). 
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of decisions to enter or exit the labor market and does not take into account some important 
features of the Spanish system, including the existence of caps and floors on contributory 
bases and pension amounts. While some of these assumptions are likely to be innocent 
simplifications that help keep the required calculations tractable at little or no cost, others 
may bias the model's predictions in ways that are hard to predict ex-ante and do render it of 
limited usefulness for the analysis of certain types of policy changes or for the study of the 
distributional implications of pension reform. In spite of its highly stylized character, 
however, the model should be able to capture correctly the effects on aggregate pension 
expenditure of changes in the system’s main parameters and in some key demographic 
variables. This makes it a useful complement of the decomposition described in the previous 
section, among other things because it imposes a certain discipline on projections of the 
evolution of the generosity of the system (the ratio between the average pension and average 
productivity), which is the component of pension spending that is hardest to model directly. 
The model assumes that the pension calculation period (N), the average number of 
contribution years of the representative pensioner (C) and the period during which 
retirement and survivors’ benefits are collected (X and X2) are equal for all agents in each 
cohort and remain constant over time.7 It also assumes constant rates of growth for 
employment (n) and average wages (g), an experience premium that grows exponentially 
with time (also at a constant rate ν) and a fixed rate of social security contribution (τ).8 For 
given values for these parameters and applying current Spanish regulations, the model can 
be used to compute the ratio between the average pension and the average salary, the internal 
rate of return (IRR) of the contributory pension system, the system’s total revenues and 
expenditure and, hence, its financial balance, the average initial replacement rate (defined as 
the ratio between the initial pension and the wage at retirement) and the sustainable value of 
this ratio.  
For the purposes of the exercise in this paper, the result of greatest interest is the one that 
links the system’s generosity to the parameters used in pension calculations and to some 
demographic indicators. In particular, the ratio between the average pension (considering 
both retirement and survivors benefits) and the aggregate average salary is given by9 
  (4) GENW ! PW = "(C)b(N )e
#C n $#
g + n
1$ e$nC
1$ e$(n$# )C
1$ (1$ %"v )e$(g+n)X $ %"ve$(g+n)(X+X2)
1$ (1$ % )e$nX $ %e$n(X+X2)  
where  
                                                
7 This condition will be met if life expectancy and the ages of retirement and entry into the labor market 
remain constant over time or rise at the same pace.  
8 In response to a referee's query, it should perhaps be noted that the model does allow for different 
degrees of indexing of pensions to consumer prices. It is shown numerically in de la Fuente (2011) that 
higher indexing implies a higher steady state generosity ratio. In any event, indexing plays no role in 
our results since the Spanish system provides in principle for full indexing of pensions and this has not 
been affected by the recent reform. 
9 Economy-wide aggregates are calculated by integrating over the relevant cohorts, which is a relatively 
simple exercise under the assumptions of the model. For more details, see de la Fuente (2011). 
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  (5) b(N ) = 1! e
!(g+" )N
(g + " )N  
is the so called regulatory base of the pension (expressed as a fraction of the wage at the time 
of retirement), φ(C) the percentage of the regulatory base that will be paid as pension to a 
retiree who has contributed to the system during C years, π  ( =  ½)    the probability that a 
retiree will leave behind a spouse entitled to a widower’s pension and φv (= 0.52) the fraction 
of the deceased spouse’s pension at the time of death that is paid out as widower’s pension. 
In what follows, we will assume that the share of labor in GDP (αL) remains constant. This 
implies that the steady-state value GENQ  of the generosity indicator that appears in the 
decomposition given in the previous section (the average pension as a fraction of average 
output per worker) will be a constant fraction of the ratio given in (4), that is: 
  (6) GENQ = PQ =
P
!LQ
!L
= !L
P
W = !LGENW  
  
 Parameterising the model 
When using the model in combination with our demographic and employment scenarios, we 
must bear in mind that this is essentially a steady state model that cannot describe the 
transitional dynamics induced by changes in parameter values and can only capture their 
long-term effects. Consequently, we will set the values of the model’s parameters taking as a 
reference the average values of the relevant variables that have been observed during (or are 
foreseen for) each period of interest. In particular, we will work with two different periods: 
the years between 1981 and 2007, which we will use as a reference to set certain parameter 
values, and the period between 2010 and 2060, for which we will construct spending and 
revenue projections with and without the recent reform. 
 
Table 1: Parameterization of the model in different scenarios 
 [1] [2] [3] 
 1980-2007 
2010-60 
 no changes 
2010-60 
 with reform 
Growth of labor productivity (g) 1.13% 1.13% 1.13% 
Total employment growth (n) 1.90% 0.24% 0.26% 
Experience premium (v) 1.28% 1.28% 1.28% 
Average employment rate (working-age pop.) 56.03% 68.23% 65.90% 
Average years of contribution (C) 26.34 32.07 32.29 
Life expectancy    
  For the entire population 76.66 85.9 85.9 
  Male 73.37 83.5 83.5 
  Female 79.93 88.3 88.3 
X = collection period of retirement pension 11.66 20.90 19.90 
X2 = additional years of survivors’ benefit 6.02 5.15 5.15 
Retirement age 65 65 66 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 1 summarizes the relevant data. For 1980-2007, g and n are set equal to the average rates 
of growth of output per (full-time equivalent) employed worker and of total employment 
according to the Spanish National Accounts (INE, 2011a). The two rates are calculated by 
regressing the logarithm of the corresponding variable on a linear trend. Regarding labor 
productivity, our assumption for 2010-2060 is that the average growth rate observed in 1980-
2007 will remain constant in the future. In the case of employment, the value of n for the 
period 2010-2060 under each scenario s – with or without reform – is set equal to the expected 
growth rate of employment during the period according to the employment projections 
discussed later on. This variable is calculated directly, rather than estimated econometrically, 
using observed current employment and the expected value of the same variable in 2060 
  ns = ln L2060
s ! ln L2010s
50  
where 
 
Lts  is expected employment in period t under scenario s. 
The average years of contribution by the representative retiree are estimated as the product of 
the average employment rate of the working-age population in the relevant scenario, 
(calculated as the average of its annual values) and the maximum theoretical duration of the 
working life of an individual, 65 - 18 = 47 years.10 The average duration of a retirement 
pension (X) is approximated as the difference between the average life expectancy of the 
population as a whole (using, once again, the average during the relevant period) and the 
retirement age, which we set equal to the legal age of 65 during the pre-reform period. Since, 
as we have seen, the reform contemplates significant exceptions to the new retirement age of 
67, for purposes of calculating X during the post-reform period, we will set the average 
retirement age to 66 years. The collection period of a survivors’ pension (X2) is taken to be the 
difference between the life expectancy of women and that of the population as a whole, plus 
2.75 years, which is the average age difference between men and women at the time of 
marriage according to INE’s marriage statistics (2011c). For 1980-2007, we use the average of 
life expectancy at birth in 1975 and in 2005. For 2010-2060, we use the average of the 2005 and 
2060 values of this variable. The second figure is estimated by adding to life expectancy in 
2005 the increase in the same variable forecasted by Eurostat in its 2008 population scenario 
(on which our projections are based).  
The value of the experience premium (v) is chosen so that the model reproduces the average 
initial replacement rate (that is, the ratio between the initial pension and the salary at the time 
of retirement) observed among new retirees who entered the system in 2008, as estimated by 
Devesa (2009, p. 64) using the panel of work histories put together by the Spanish Ministry of 
Labor (the so called “Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales”). Finally, the social security 
contribution rate is assumed to be equal to 95% of the contribution rate for common 
                                                
10 In scenarios [1] and [2], the working age population is identified with the population between the 
ages of 18 and 64, while in scenario [3] the population aged 18 to 66 is used. In the latter case, the 
average years of contribution are approximated by multiplying the employment rate of the relevant age 
group by 67 – 18 = 49 years of potential working life. 
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contingencies under the so called General Regime to which most salaried workers belong, 
calculated as the sum of the rates applicable to companies (23.6%) and to workers (4.7%).11 
  
 3.3. Approximating the system’s dynamics 
If the growth rates of productivity and employment and the parameters used in the pension 
calculation remain constant for a sufficiently long period, the generosity indicator of the 
system will gradually approach the value predicted by the model outlined in the preceding 
section. As we have seen, the model cannot be used directly to project the evolution of GENQ 
on a yearly basis, but it can be used to calculate its long-term value (conditional on constant 
growth rates of certain aggregates). This, in turn, will allow us to approximate the system’s 
dynamics in a way that should be sufficient for our purposes. 
For short, let y be the logarithm of GENQ and let us assume that the parameters of the 
pension system and the rates of growth of productivity and employment remain constant for 
a long period of time. Since we know that y tends to converge to the long-term value given in 
(6), 
  y = lnGENQ , 
it seems reasonable to assume that the trajectory of this variable can be approximated by an 
expression of the form 
  (7) !yt = "b(yt " y )  
where b > 0 is the rate at which the system converges towards its long-term equilibrium.  
What would a reasonable value for b be? If we take the model literally – and accept, in 
particular, the assumption that all agents in a cohort have lives of the same non-stochastic 
duration – the transition to a new steady state after any parametric change should be nearly 
complete after X years (where X is the difference between life expectancy and the retirement 
age) given that, after this period, all individuals whose pensions had been set prior to the 
reform of the system will be dead. While some widows from the “old regime” will remain in 
the system for a few years, their weight in total expenditure will be small, because not all 
pensioners leave a widower behind and because widower pensions are much smaller than 
retirement pensions. The weight of widowers will be particularly small when the number of 
retirees is growing over time and when productivity, and hence the average pension, is also 
growing. 
In practice, of course, the transition will be a bit slower than in the case we have just 
described because some of the pensions granted under the old regime will be collected for 
more than X years, but it is still true that the bulk of the transition should have been 
completed in that time. Therefore, a reasonable assumption that can be used to set the value 
of b may be that after X years 75% of the initial distance of y from its steady-state value will 
have disappeared. 
                                                
11 See section 1 of the Appendix. 
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The solution to the difference equation given in (7) can be written  
  (8) yt ! y = (yo ! y )* (1! b)t  
where yo  is the initial value of the (log of) the generosity indicator at the time of the system’s 
reform and t the time elapsed since then.  Our assumption on the speed of adjustment is that 
after X years only 25% of the initial distance from the steady state will remain, that is, that 
  (9) yX ! y = 0.25 *(yo ! y )  
Substituting (9) into (8) evaluated at t=X, we have  
  (10) yX ! y = (yo ! y )* (1! b)X = 0.25 *(yo ! y )  
Operating on this expression, we have 
  (1! b)X = 0.25" ln(1! b) = 1X ln0.25" b = 1! Exp
ln0.25
X
#
$%
&
'(  
With the value of X corresponding to the baseline scenario for 2010-2060 (20.9 years), this 
expression yields a value of 6.42% for the convergence parameter, b. 
  
 4. Baseline scenario: expenditure and net balance projections in the absence of reforms 
This section describes the construction of the baseline or no-policy-change scenario. We have 
projected the evolution of pension expenditure in the absence of reforms by making minor 
adjustments to the baseline scenario set forth in de la Fuente and Doménech (2010). Our point 
of departure is the demographic projections recently constructed for Spain by Eurostat 
(Europop 2008). Eurostat’s baseline scenario for Spain assumes a gradual decline in net 
immigration from more than 600,000 people in 2008 to a bit over 150,000 a year starting in 
2040, a mild recovery in the birth rate from 1.39 children per woman in 2008 to 1.56 in 2060 
and a rapid increase in life expectancy of 7.5 years for men and 5.7 years for women over the 
same period.12 With these assumptions, the aging process will be quite rapid: the old-age 
dependency rate (defined as the quotient between the 65+ population and the population 
aged 18-64) will rise sharply over the next five decades, rising from 0.25 in 2008 to 0.62 in 
2060.13  
                                                
12 Eurostat has just released a new population projection (Europop 2010). We have been unable to use it 
as a basis for our calculations because Eurostat's website only provides data at five-year intervals and 
only disaggregates the population by 5-year age segments. The new Eurostat scenario and its 
predecessor share very similar assumptions regarding the evolution of fertility rates and life expectancy 
and differ mostly on the expected time profile of migration. While expected average yearly net inflows 
over the period remain almost unchanged, Europop 2010 assumes a hump-shaped pattern of this 
variable, which gradually recovers from rather low levels during the current crisis before declining 
again gradually after 2020. As a result, Europop 2010 projects a more rapid increase in the dependency 
rate until 2040 or so and a slower one after that date, with this variable reaching a lower peak a bit 
earlier than expected in the earlier exercise. For more details, see section 2 of the Appendix. 
13 In general, Eurostat’s 2008 scenario is more optimistic than INE’s most recent long-term projections 
(INE, 2010), although not in every respect. INE estimates a net migratory inflow of roughly 50,000 
people per year for 2009-2018 and roughly 70,000 for 2019-2048, which is far below Eurostat’s projection. 
On the other hand, INE is somewhat more optimistic than Eurostat regarding the recovery of the birth 
rate. In 2048, the Institute expects a birth rate of 1.71 children per woman, compared with the 1.52 
 12 
According to the National Statistical Institute’s current population projections (INE, 2011b), 
the growth of the Spanish population between January 2008 and the same month of 2011 was 
below Eurostat’s projections, probable due to the effects of the current crisis on fertility and 
on inmigration. In order to base our population series on the latest observed values of this 
variable, we have modified Eurostat’s population scenario in the simplest possible way: for 
each age segment of interest, we take as a given the population estimate as of January 1st 
2011 provided by INE and we extend the series forward to 2060 using the growth rate of the 
same population segment in Eurostat’s original 2008 baseline scenario. 
We have also introduced minor changes in the employment projections reported in our 
earlier paper while maintaining the rather optimistic long-term assumptions on which our 
baseline scenario was based. The change has to do with the evolution of employment until 
2015, which has been adjusted in two respects. First, we have used the observed values of this 
variable between 2008 and 2010 (taken from the Nacional Accounts and measured by full 
time equivalent employment).14 Second, we extend the series until 2015 by using the 
macroeconomic baseline scenario of BBVA Research as of June 2011. From 2015 onward, the 
assumption of the previous paper is maintained, namely, that the employment rate of the 
population aged 18 to 64 will converge, at an annual rate of 4%, to the employment rate of 
Spanish men aged between 16 and 64 in 2007 (77.4%), which is quite close to the employment 
rates (defined as the ratio of employment to the working-age population) of Japan, the Nordic 
countries, Canada or the US. 
 
Figure 2: Projection of the number of pensions per employed worker  
in the absence of reforms 
 
 
By adding to these premises the assumption that the coverage rate (defined as the number of 
pensions per person of retirement age) remains constant at its observed level in 2010 (which 
                                                                                                                                      
estimated by Eurostat for the same year. Finally, the anticipated increase in life expectancy is greater in 
the INE scenario. According to the Institute, life expectancy at birth in 2048 would be 84.31 years for 
men and 89.89 years for women, compared with 83.4 and 88.4 years according to Eurostat. 
14 The figures for 2010 are taken from the Quarterly National Accounts. 
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was 1.12), we can project the evolution of the number of pensions per employed worker 
(NPENSPW), which is the first component of the ratio of pension expenditure to GDP. Figure 
2 shows the evolution of this ratio under the assumptions listed above and in the absence of 
reforms to the pension system. The high rate of growth of this indicator observed in 2007-
2010 is largely due to cyclical reasons, and particularly to the rapid job destruction we have 
experienced during the current crisis. The growth of this ratio can be expected to decline 
somewhat in the near future before rising again sharply in the next decade, this time due to 
structural causes having to do with the retirement of the baby boom generation.  
Minor changes from our previous paper have also been made in the modeling of the 
evolution of the system’s generosity ratio. In particular, while we maintain the procedure 
used to estimate the long-term value of this variable, our assumptions regarding the system’s 
transitional dynamics have changed. In our previous paper we assumed a linear transition 
between the last observed value of GENQ and the model’s steady-state prediction that would 
be completed in 2060. In this paper, the transition is modelled using the methodology 
described in the preceding section and the steady state is attained only asymptotically. 
 
Table 2 Estimated steady-state values for the P /W  ratio 
_____________________________________ 
 
Estimated 
value index 
1980-2007 0.704 100.0 
2010-2060, no reform 0.809 115.0 
2010-2060, with reform 0.700 98.3 
_____________________________________ 
 
The method used to estimate the steady state has not changed. Using equation (4) and the 
parameter values given in Table 1, we have calculated the steady-state values of the P /W  
ratio predicted by the model (see Table 2). The observed value of this ratio in 2007 (using data 
on retirement pensions of the general regime) is 0.51, which is substantially lower than the 
model’s prediction. If the model were correct, this would indicate that we are still far from 
the steady state and that the upward trend of P /W  that we observe in recent decades would 
persist in the future even if all system parameters remained constant indefinitely at the values 
we observed during 1980-2007. Further, the model’s prediction for the P /W  ratio in the 
absence of reforms is higher for 2010-2060 than for 1980-2007, mainly due to the increase in 
average years of contribution implied by our optimistic employment scenario. Striving to be 
conservative, we will not directly use the model’s prediction for the steady-state value of the 
P /W  ratio. Instead, we will assume that in 2007 the system was in the steady state 
corresponding to the parameters of the 1980-2007 period and that the steady-state value for 
the P/W ratio will increase in the same proportion as the model’s prediction for 2010-2060 in 
relation to the prediction for 1980-2007. That is, for each scenario, the steady-state value of 
P /W  for 2010-2060 is estimated by multiplying the observed value of this ratio in 2007 by 
the index in the second column of Table 2. Finally, we will assume that the share of wages in 
national income remains constant over time. This implies that the long-term generosity ratio, 
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measured in terms of the average productivity of labour, GENQ, will also increase in the 
same proportion.  
Figure 3 shows the expected path of the generosity indicator in the absence of reforms. 
Combining this variable with the NPENSPW projection described above yields the projection 
of total expenditure shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 3: Projection of the generosity ratio  
(average pension/GDP per employed worker) 
 
 
Figure 4: Projection of pension expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
 
 
We have also projected the evolution of the system's revenues and the balance of the Pension 
Reserve Fund (PRF) over the period of interest. Since Social Security contributions are levied 
at a fixed rate on wage income (subject to a ceiling and a cap), it seems reasonable to assume 
that, as a first approximation, contribution revenue will remain constant over time as a 
fraction of the aggregate wage bill and of GDP. Starting from this assumption, we have 
introduced a minor correction to account for the increased State contribution to the financing 
of minimum pension complements that is mandated by law (see section 1 of the Appendix). 
With this correction, we project the pension system’s revenues as a fraction of GDP to rise 
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from 9.12% in 2010 to 9.52% in 2017 and to remain constant at that level thereafter. Under 
these assumptions, which are relatively optimistic, the system would experience a permanent 
deficit from 2019 onward. If we assume that the minor surpluses accumulated during some of 
the earlier years are deposited in the Pension Reserve Fund (PRF) and that this Fund earns a 
real annual return of 2%, the PRF would run out in 2027. After this point, the system’s debt 
would balloon in the absence of policy changes, reaching 250% of GDP in 2060 (again 
assuming a real rate of return of 2%). 
  
 5. The financial effects of the reform: a quick estimate 
The impact of the measures described in section 2 on the number of pensions per employed 
worker is easily calculated with a few additional assumptions. Increasing the retirement age 
will reduce the number of pensioners and increase the number of employed persons. To 
quantify the effects of this measure, we have ignored the possibility of early retirement and 
assumed that those affected by the increase in the retirement age have an employment rate 
that is similar to that of the population aged between 60 and 64 years in the year 2007  (which 
was 33%). In order to account for the exceptions to the rising of the retirement age, we will 
assume that only half of the potentially relevant population is actually affected by this 
measure. 
 
Figure 5: Projection of employment and retirement-age population, 
with and without reform (2007=100) 
 
 
Figure 5 shows the implications of the reform for the evolution of employment and the 
retirement-age population and Figure 6 summarizes its estimated impact on the number of 
pensions per employed worker. Under our hypotheses, the gradual rise in the retirement age 
will temporarily stabilize the ratio between pensioners and employed persons. Starting in the 
second half of the next decade, however, growth in the first variable surges, with dramatic 
effects on the first major component of pension expenditure.  
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Figure 6: Projection of the number of pensions per employed worker 
 
 
Figure 7: Evolution of the long-term generosity ratio with and without the reform 
 
 
Projecting the evolution of the generosity ratio is somewhat more complicated than in the 
baseline scenario because of the gradual nature of the reform. For each transition year t we 
have used the model outlined above to calculate the long-term generosity ratio yt  that would 
correspond to the parameters of the system at t, which would vary from year to year between 
2012 and 2027. Figure 7 shows the time path of yt , which would gradually fall from 0.196 to 
0.168 with the implementation of the reforms. Hence, the changes in the calculation 
procedure introduced in the new law will reduce the average pension (relative to the average 
wage) by 14.5% for a given time path of earnings and social contributions.15 
                                                
15 Since wages are exogenous in our model, this figure is very close to the expected reduction in the 
pension of the average worker that would follow from the reform other things equal. Given our 
assumptions on the growth rate of wages over the lifecycle, an increase in the pension computation 
period from 15 to 25 years will reduce an individual’s starting pension by 10.43%. For an individual 
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To approximate the system’s year to year dynamics, we will proceed as above while allowing 
the steady state to vary over time. That is, we will assume that in year t the value of the 
logarithm of the generosity ratio converges to its steady-state value for the same year and 
does so at the same rate we used in the previous section, in accordance with the following 
expression  
  (7') !yt = "b(yt " yt )  
which is identical to equation (7) except that yt  now has a time sub-index that tells us that the 
system is approaching a moving target during the transition period.  
 
Figure 8: Projection of the generosity ratio of the pension system 
 (average pension/GDP per employed worker) with and without the reform 
 
 
Figure 8 shows the estimated trajectory of the generosity ratio after the reform. Combining 
this projection with our prior estimate of the number of pensions per employed worker yields 
the spending projection summarised in Figure 9 and the estimate of savings arising from the 
reform that is shown in Figure 10 as a percentage of GDP and measured in Figure 11 by the 
percentage reduction in pension expenditure. Figure 10 also shows our estimate of how 
savings would have increased in the absence of the noted exceptions to the new retirement 
age and Figure 11 shows a decomposition of the reduction in expenditure into its three 
immediate sources.16 Looking at the last figure we see that in the long run the bulk of the  
                                                                                                                                      
with 35 years of contribution, the change in the scale linking years of contribution to pension amounts 
will reduce his starting pension by 4.40%. Both changes together will translate into a 14.37% reduction 
in the starting pension. 
16 Given some variable of interest, X, let Xtref and Xtnoref  denote its projected time path with and 
without the reform. The percentage change in the value of X as a result of the reform can be 
approximated by 
  %!Xt = ln Xtref " ln Xtnoref  
Referring to equations (1) and (2) in section 2.1, observe that the ratio of pension expenditure to GDP 
can be written in the form 
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Figure 9: Projection of pension expenditure as a percentage of GDP, 
with and without the reform 
 
Figure 10: Savings resulting from the reform, in percentage points of GDP 
 
expected savings come from the reduction in the generosity of the system, whose effects build 
up gradually over time and converge asyntotically to the 14.5% steady-state reduction in this 
variable estimated above. The reduction in the number of retirees is also important during the 
transition years but gradually loses importance once the age of retirement stops rising. 
                                                                                                                                      
  PEXPGDP = COV *
NRET
L *GENQ  
Under our assumptions, the reform reduces the number of potential retirees, NRET, increases 
employment, L, and reduces the system’s generosity factor, GENQ. Hence, the percentage change in 
expenditure, measured as a fraction of GDP, can be written as the sum of the contributions of these 
three factors, ie. 
  %! PEXPGDP =%!NRET "%!L +%!GENQ  
which is the formula used to construct Figure 11. 
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Finally, the expected increase in employment is too small to have a significant effect on the 
spending ratio. 
 
Figure 11: Percentage reduction in pension expenditure as a result of the reform 
and its immediate sources 
 
Figure 12: Projection of the Pension Reserve Fund/accumulated debt  
of the pension system as a percentage of GDP 
 
 
On the basis of our assumptions regarding the evolution of employment, productivity and 
demographics, the results of the analysis suggest that the proposed reforms would reduce 
pension expenditure by up to 20% by 2050. Expected savings would amount to 1.4 points of 
GDP at the end of the transition period in 2027 and to 3.25 points by mid-century (which 
would increase to 2.0 and 3.8 points respectively without the approved exceptions to the new 
retirement age). In this scenario, the reform would suffice to stabilize pension expenditure as 
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a percentage of GDP during the transition period. In the absence of further reforms, however, 
spending is projected to rise quickly starting in 2030 and to reach 15% of GDP by 2050, 
thereby generating deficit levels that would be very difficult to sustain. 
The implications of the reform for the financial balance of the system are summarized in 
Figure 12, which displays the expected evolution of the Pension Reserve Fund or the system’s 
accumulated debt with and without the reform. As noted above, in the no-reform scenario, 
the PRF would run out by 2027. The reform would push this date back to 2037, giving us an 
additional decade to design and implement the additional measures that would be required 
to prevent the insolvency of the sytem during the 2040s. Eliminating the exceptions to the 
new retirement age would buy us five additional years before the PRF runs out. 
 
 Comparison with other projections 
A number of other estimates of the effects of the recent reform are already available. The 
Spanish Ministry of Economics and Finance has included its own projections (with and 
without taking into account the so called sustainability factor) in the latest version of Spain’s 
Stability Program for 2011-14 (MEH, 2011). These projections seem to have been accepted by 
the OECD and the IMF and have been included in their recent reports on pension systems in 
member states and on the situation of the Spanish economy (OECD 2011 and IMF 2011). The 
Ministry, however, gives few methodological details and reports only that its estimates have 
been based on INE’s (2010) demographic projections and on a macro scenario consistent with 
the common methodology used by EU members for medium and long-term projections. The 
Bank of Spain has also included estimates of the savings derived from the reform in its recent 
annual report (2011), which have been obtained using an overlapping generation model and 
Eurostat’s 2008 population projections. Some academic researchers have also studied the 
subject. Conde-Ruiz and Gonzalez (2011) analyze the effects of the reform using an 
accounting model with heterogeneous agents calibrated using data from the Labor Force 
Survey and the Continuous Sample of Working Lives and INE’s (2005) long-term population 
projections. Finally, Díaz-Giménez and Díaz-Saavedra (2011) use a calibrated dynamic 
general equilibrium model and INE’s 2010 population scenario to analyze the impact of two 
of the three key measures introduced in the recent law: an increase of two years in the 
retirement age and the extension of the calculation period from 15 to 25 years. Table 3 
compares our estimates of the savings arising from the reform with those from other studies. 
As can be seen in the Table, our results lie almost exactly in the middle of the range of the 
available estimates when savings are measured in relative terms (as a fraction of the expected 
increase in pension expenditure in the absence of the reform) and at its upper end when 
savings are measured in absolute terms (as percentage points of GDP). While there are 
significant differences across estimates that are not always easy to trace back to primary 
assumptions (because of the use of very different approaches and the limited methodological 
information that is provided in some cases) all the existing studies agree in qualitative terms 
and suggest that the recent reform will significantly reduce the growth rate of pension 
expenditure over the next four decades.  
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Table 3: Alternative estimates of the savings derived from the reform 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
in 
 % points 
 of GDP 
as a % of the 
expected increase 
in pension 
expenditure w/o 
the reform 
this paper 3,25% 33% 
MEH (2011) 2,50% 38% 
  + sustainability factor 3,50% 53% 
Bank of Spain (2011) 2,84% 43% 
Diaz Giménez & Diaz Saavedra (2011) 2,77% 30% 
Conde & González (2011) 2,87% 29% 
average w/o sustainability factor 2,85% 34% 
______________________________________________________________ 
- Note: The second column is obtained by dividing the first one by the expected increase in pension 
expenditure in the absence of the reform until 2050. In the case of MEH (2011) and Bank of Spain (2011) 
this last magnitude is taken from the official estimates of aging-related expenditure prepared by the 
Economic Policy Committee of the EU. In our case and that of Conde and González (2011) we calculate 
it as the difference between projected expenditure in 2050 and observed expenditure in 2010 and in Díaz 
Giménez and Díaz Saavedra as the difference between projected expenditure in 2050 and in 2010. 
 
 
 6. Conclusions 
This paper presents a preliminary estimate of the financial impact of the recent reform of the 
Spanish public pension system. After updating our earlier projections of spending on 
contributory pensiones during the period 2008-60 in the absence of reforms (de la Fuente and 
Doménech, 2010), we have estimated the impact on this variable of the three main measures 
included in the new law: increasing the retirement age to 67 with significant exceptions, 
extending the pension calculation period to 25 years and increasing to 37 the number of 
contribution years required to be entitled to 100% of the regulatory base. 
Although reasonable doubts remain as to whether or not these measures will be sufficient to 
ensure by themselves the financial sustainability of the system, they do constitute a 
significant step in the right direction for three reasons. First, because they have triggered an 
important public debate about the sustainability of the public pension system that has not 
been restricted to the political parties. Second, because the agreement to raise the retirement 
age has broken a real taboo. Now that that barrier has been crossed, it will be much easier to 
deal with the further changes that may be required in the future to ensure the sustainability 
of the system. Lastly, and in line with the previous point, because the introduction of the 
sustainability factor entails a qualitative change in the nature of the system by introducing a 
quasi-automatic mechanism for making reforms that had previously required long gestation 
periods and laborious agreements. 
Contingent upon certain assumptions about the evolution of employment, productivity and 
demographics, the results of this paper suggest that the three main reforms introduced in the 
new pension law will have a significant impact on expenditure and may be expected to yield 
savings of around 1.4 points of GDP at the end of the transition period in 2027 and of 3.25 
points by mid-century. In this scenario, the reform would stabilize pension expenditure at a 
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bit over 9% of GDP during the transition period, thereby preventing the emergence of a 
structural deficit in the system before the end of the next decade. In the absence of further 
reforms, however, we anticipate that expenditure will increase rapidly after 2030, reaching 
more than 15% of GDP by 2050. Hence, additional reforms will be required in the future to 
prevent the emergence of large deficits. 
Given the uncertainty that surrounds the projections of many of the variables of interest, we 
cannot rule out the possibility that, even with the reform, the system may begin to experience 
a structural deficit before the end of the transition period. Under these conditions, a sensible 
precaution would be to move up the introduction of the sustainability factor to the start of the 
reform, rather than waiting for the end of the transition period. This would activate a 
mechanism that could be used to modulate the pace and scope of the reforms, should the 
financial situation of the system so require before the end of the transition period. Further, it 
is clear that the financial health of the system depends not only on the evolution of life 
expectancy but also on other variables like the employment and dependency rates that 
influence the number of pensions per employed person. One important implication of this 
observation is that the sustainability factor cannot be linked only to life expectancy, as the 
wording of the law appears to indicate (BOE 2011, art. 8), but must also take into account 
other variables that are relevant for the financial health of the system. 
In addition to any further parametric changes that should prove necessary in the future to 
ensure the sustainability of public pensions, it is very important to increase the transparency 
of the system by supplying additional information both to contributors and to pensioners. 
This would enable society to internalize the close relationship that exists between 
contributions and benefits and would help workers make timely and informed decisions 
regarding the best way to prepare for retirement. The experience of other European countries 
that have introduced models with notional accounts in their public pension systems, like 
Sweden, Italy, Poland or Latvia, should provide a useful reference in this regard. While 
stopping well short of this mark, the new law does take an important preliminary step in the 
correct direction by requiring both the Social Security system and the operators of private 
pension plans to provide their contributors or participants with information regarding their 
likely future pension rights (additional disposition no. 26). The provision is, however, rather 
vague and it remains to be seen how it will be implemented. 
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 Appendix 
 
 1. Data on pension revenues and expenditures 
The expenditure data we use as a starting point for our calculations refer to spending on 
contributory pensions by the Spanish Social Security system. The Gazette of Labor Statistics 
(Boletín de Estadísticas Laborales) (MITIN, 2011a) provides data on the number of pensions paid 
every month (between 1988 and 2010) broken down by type of pension (retirement, disability, 
survivors’ benefits, and benefits for orphans and other family members) and the average 
amount of each type of pension.17 Total pension expenditure is estimated by multiplying the 
average number of pensions payable in each year by their average annual amount (which is 
calculated as fourteen times the monthly amount).18 The calculation is done separately for 
each type of pension and the results are aggregated. We have checked that the total obtained 
in this way approximately matches the figure in the General State Budget for this item.  
In Spain, contributions for common contingencies cover a series of contingencies in addition to 
retirement. As a result, it is not possible in principle to isolate a specific contribution to the 
pension system. On the basis of an internal Spanish Government report cited by Doménech 
and Melguizo (2008), we estimate that 95% of such contributions can be imputed to the 
pension system. To this, we must add a transfer from the State’s General Administration to 
cover a growing fraction of the "minimum complements" that raise the lowest contributory 
pensions to the minimum set by law. Our data on the system’s revenues are taken from the 
Economic and Financial Report of the General Social Security Budget for fiscal year 2011 and 
the Appendix to that document (MITIN, 2011b). 
According to MITIN (2011b, pp. 54 and 185) in 2010 the system’s total revenues amounted to 
9.12% of GDP. State contributions to minimum pension complements totaled 2.706,35 million 
euros, or 0.25% of GDP, which represented 38.8% of the total cost of the program (of 6.972,43 
Meuros). The Social Security Law currently in force (transitory disposition no. 14 in BOE, 
various years) establishes that the State should pay the full cost of pension complements by 
2014, but it is widely acknowledged that the current state of public finances will make it 
impossible to reach this goal on time.19 Trying to be realistic, we have assumed that the State 
gradually increases its contribution to the program starting in 2013 and starts covering its full 
cost (which is assumed to remain constant as a percentage of GDP) by the year 2017. 
 
 
                                                
17 To calculate annual expenditure, we have taken into account the fact that pensions are paid out in 
fourteen installments per year, including extra payments in july and december. 
18  The total number of pensions payable is greater than the number of pensioners because one person 
may have more than one pension. 
19 In this regard, it is worth noting that the reform law contains only a vague compromise to work 
towards this goal, which is often known as “separation of sources” of financing. Its additional 
disposition no. 12 requires the Government to “seek formulas” to make fiscal consolidation and the 
separation of sources compatible with each other. 
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 2. Europop 2008 vs. Europop 2010 
As noted in the text, Eurostat has recently updated its population projections for EU member 
countries. Table A.1 and Figure A.1 compare the basic assumptions underlying the two 
Europop projections. Europop 2010 is a bit more optimistic than its predecessor regarding the 
evolution of life expectancy of both males and females and assumes a rather different time 
path of net migration inflows. In view of the sharp decline in inmigration observed during 
recent years as a result of the current crisis, the time path of migration assumed in Europop 
2010 seems more plausible than that projected in the earlier exercise. In spite of this, average 
yearly inflows are almost identical in the two scenarios. 
 
Table A.1: Assumed values of key demographic parameters in 2060 
_____________________________________________________ 
   
Europop 
2008 
Europop 
2010 
Total fertility rate  1.56 1.56 
Life expectancy at birth - males 84.9 85.4 
Life expectancy at birth - females 89.6 89.9 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
Figure A.1: Net inmigration projections, Europop 2008 vs. 2010 
 
 
The difference in migration profiles has the expected effect on the time path of the 
dependency rate (defined here as the ratio betweeen the population aged 65 or more and the 
population between 15 and 64 years of age). Since inmigration is slower in the Europop 2010 
scenario during the first half of the period and faster during the second half, the dependency 
ratio rises faster at first and then falls below the path expected in the previous exercise. The 
effect of this on the net financial balance on the pension system is straightforward. Other 
things equal, switching from Europop 2008 to Europop 2010 will bring the system into deficit 
at a somewhat earlier date but will also modestly reduce the severity of its financial problems 
in the final part of the sample period. It should be emphasized, however, that the results of 
the exercises undertaken in this paper would not change qualitatively with the adoption of 
the new Eurostat projections as our starting point. 
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Figure A.2: Projections of the old-age dependency ratio, Europop 2008 vs. 2010 
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